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Thought experiments can and do increase our understanding. In this chapter, I use 
resources from mainstream epistemology to help explain this feat. I present three main 
kinds of understanding identified in mainstream epistemology, and show how each of these 
may be created by thought experiments in different ways. I close with some epistemo-
logical discussion of those ways, and the cognitive activities that underpin them. While 
everything I say is meant to hold for the relation between thought experiments and under-
standing in general, my examples will come from the scientific domain.
1 Why talk about thought experiments in  
the context of understanding?
It can be tempting to see the entire epistemological literature on thought experiments as 
focused on a single issue: whether the facts about thought experiments support rational-
ism, empiricism, or whether some naturalist middle ground is to be preferred. Rationalism, 
empiricism, and naturalism are views about the source of knowledge. Taken as an issue 
concerning knowledge, the epistemological question about thought experiments is: how 
do thought experiments produce new empirical knowledge without new experience? And 
indeed, many authors frame their accounts explicitly in answer to this question (e.g., 
Kuhn 1977, 241; Brown 2004, 34; Gendler 2004, 1152; Norton 2004, 44; Häggqvist 2009; 
Thagard 2010, 251; Davies, this volume; Goffi and Roux, this volume). But knowledge is 
not the only or even necessarily the most interesting epistemological desideratum. I think 
understanding gives it a run for its money, and many others do too (Kvanvig 2003, 2009; 
Elgin 2006; Pritchard 2009, 2010; Grimm 2012; Dellsén 2016).
To motivate the point, here are a few uses of thought experiments that seem to aim at 
understanding: thought experiments can illustrate a theory or theoretical claim (Brown 
1991, 32; Peacock, this volume; Schabas, this volume), they can control extraneous vari-
ables and “invert ideals of natural order” (Sorensen 1992, 11–16), they can “exemplify” 
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properties and relations (Elgin 2014), they can provide “hypothetical explanations” 
(Schlaepfer and Weber, this volume), they can help us to see how rival theories lead 
to different results (Brun, this volume), and they can make certain intuitions accessible 
(Lenhard, this volume).
Thought experiments that play the above roles can improve the quality of our epistemo-
logical relationships with the world without necessarily (or merely) increasing our stock of 
justified true beliefs. For instance, illustrating a claim is not the same as justifying that claim 
or suggesting that it is true, since we can illustrate false claims. The same goes for attention-
drawing. I do not deny that new knowledge can result from such thought experiments (e.g., 
we can always gain knowledge that we have just performed a thought experiment). I merely 
claim that there is more to the epistemological power of thought experiments than knowl-
edge production.1 We must not restrict our epistemologies of thought experiments therefore 
to whatever is reconstructible as a set of true propositions.2
Before we explore how thought experiments increase our understanding, we need to say 
something about understanding itself.
2 Kinds of understanding
Having recovered from philosophical banishment by the positivists (see De Regt 2009, 
22–4) and behaviorists (see Barsalou 1999), understanding is again a respectable notion 
in epistemology. And there are many characterizations of what it could be. Wesley 
Salmon portrayed understanding as whatever a good explanation provides (Salmon 1984). 
According to Michael Friedman, understanding is what we get when we reduce the num-
ber of fundamental entities that we have to admit in a theory (1974). Phillip Kitcher 
modified this idea by portraying understanding as what happens when we find a way to 
explain different phenomena using the same patterns of argument (1981). Henk De Regt 
characterizes understanding in terms of intelligibility, which is “the value that scientists 
attribute to the cluster of virtues (of a theory in one or more of its representations) that 
facilitate the use of the theory for the construction of models” (2009, 31). Hasok Chang 
argues that understanding “is knowing how to perform an epistemic activity” (2009, 75). 
Catherine Elgin claims that
We understand rules and reasons, actions and passions, objectives and obstacles, 
techniques and tools, forms and functions and fictions as well as facts. We also 
understand pictures, words, equations, and diagrams ... Understanding need not 
be couched in sentences. It might equally be located in apt terminology, insightful 
questions, effective nonverbal symbols ... Even a scientist’s understanding of her 
subject typically outstrips her words. It is realized in her framing of problems, her 
design and execution of experiments, her response to research failures and suc-
cesses, and so on.
(1993, 14–15)
It is implicit in this passage that we should not limit the objects of understanding to propo-
sitions: we can also understand e.g., actions, passions, etc. And Elgin points out that not 
all understanding is linguistically expressible, which further distances it from propositional 
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knowledge. Finally, Elgin hints where to find understanding: it is in the way we speak, work, 
wonder, and interact with the world. It is a matter of knowing where something fits in with 
our existing commitments and abilities.
The literature on understanding accommodates the above insights in classic analytic 
fashion by breaking up the concept of understanding into sub-types, each of which 
captures a different set of the properties we intuitively want to ascribe to understanding. 
Philosophers have therefore distinguished transitive from intransitive understanding; 
propositional from non-propositional understanding; interrogative (understanding what, 
where, and how) from non-interrogative understanding (see Baumberger 2011, 68–71; 
Carter and Gordon 2014, 3; and Baumberger, Beisbart, and Brun 2016); understanding 
as a faculty from understanding as a process from understanding as a result (Baumberger 
2011, 69); and among moral, aesthetic, scientific, mathematical, and philosophical 
understandings (Hills 2015). Any distinction is as good as any other in principle: what 
matters is the philosophical work it allows us to do. In this chapter, I will focus primar-
ily on a distinction found in the literature between three types of understanding, as 
follows.
The first type is explanatory understanding, which is discussed by, e.g., Duncan Pritchard 
(2010, 74), Carl Hempel (1965, 334), Philip Kitcher (1989, 419), Stephen Grimm 
(2008), De Regt (2009, 588), Kareem Khalifa (2012), Michael Strevens (2013), Alison 
Hills (2015), Michael Hannon (forthcoming), and many others. The second is objectual 
understanding, discussed by, e.g., Christoph Baumberger (2011), Baumberger and Georg 
Brun (2016), Elgin (2007), Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Khalifa (2013), Daniel Wilkenfeld 
(2014), and Christoph Kelp (2015). Finally, there is practical understanding, which is men-
tioned by many but discussed in depth by few, at least in the main debate in epistemology. 
Let us look more closely at these types of understanding.
Explanatory understanding (EU) is having an explanation for why something is the 
case (De Regt 2009, 25; Khalifa 2011, 108). It can be propositional, though it need not 
be. For instance, Grimm (2006) and Hazlett (forthcoming) argue that explanations can be 
ostensive, as when my mechanic explains why my car won’t start by pointing to the burnt-
out ignition switches (Grimm 2006, 531).
Objectual understanding (OU) is understanding a thing, set of related things, or a sub-
ject matter. One popular way of characterizing this sort of understanding is as grasping 
the “coherence-making relationships” in a comprehensive body of information (Kvanvig 
2003, 192), or as grasping and committing to a theory of something (Baumberger 2011, 
forthcoming). It relates to Elgin’s claim (1993, 14–15) that “understanding a particular 
fact or finding, concept or value, technique or law is largely a matter of knowing where it 
fits and how it functions in the matrix of commitments that constitute the science.” Here 
is an example of OU from Baumberger,
Understanding global warming involves, for instance, understanding what effects 
(on natural and social systems) it will have, how it is linked to human activities 
(such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation) and related phenomena (such as 
the destruction of stratospheric ozone and global dimming), how far greenhouse 
gas emissions and, as a result, temperatures are likely to rise in the future, and how 
the changes will vary over the globe.
(Baumberger 2011, 77–8)
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Finally, there is practical understanding (PU), as in, “Jimi understands how to play guitar,” 
which is “clearly not explanatory” (Khalifa 2013, 123). Elgin captures it this way:
Understanding physics is not merely or mainly a matter of knowing physical truths. 
It involves a feel for the subject, a capacity to operate successfully within the con-
straints the discipline dictates or to challenge those constraints effectively. And it 
involves an ability to profit from cognitive labors, to draw out the implications of 
findings, to integrate them into theory, to utilize them in practice.
(1993, 14–15)
PU may be phrased as knowledge-how or tacit knowledge, but in any case it is not standard 
propositional knowledge. For example, it does not appear to be susceptible to Gettier-style 
defeaters. Furthermore, it is not OU, as having that sort of understanding of guitars or play-
ing guitars would not imply that Jimi could actually play the guitar, which is something that 
is necessary for PU. Likewise it is not EU, since Jimi arguably does not need to possess or be 
able to provide any explanations concerning guitar playing in order to play.
There is an on-going discussion in the literature about whether we can reduce some of 
the types of understanding mentioned to one or some of the others. For example, Khalifa 
(2013) tries to reduce OU to EU. Baumberger (2011) and Kvanvig (2009) argue that 
EU and OU cannot be reduced to one another. In my opinion, the most plausible sce-
nario concerns the reduction of EU and OU to PU. Chang (2009), Hills (2010, 2015), 
Baumberger (2011) and Wilkenfeld (2013) make claims that are at least partially in line 
with this suggestion. Having PU is having certain abilities, one of which might be the abil-
ity to provide, grasp or assess explanations. Having EU could then be explicated in terms 
of having a specific sort of PU. We also have the ability to grasp and express the relations 
among events, objects, domains, etc. So having OU could again be explicable in terms of 
having a particular sort of PU.
However, even if EU and OU were reducible to PU (and much more would need to be 
said), the abilities to give and assess explanations, as well as to grasp and express internal 
relations among members of a set, are so important that they merit their own discussions 
anyway. For example, a lack of EU will be diagnosed and remedied in particular ways that 
we would not necessarily use to diagnose and remedy a lack of PU. For instance, we can 
lack PU of x because we have not had any practice with x, or because we cannot see how 
to apply x to a new case. But we usually lack the ability to give an explanation of x because 
we lack some relevant knowledge of x (whether causal or otherwise).
In other words, even if EU, OU and PU were mutually reducible, we would still want to 
keep them apart since there are different ways of obtaining each type of understanding and 
different ways of determining when each has been achieved. This is particularly clear in the 
scientific context (Stuart 2016). In any case, until OU and PU are reduced to EU, the cur-
rent overwhelming focus in mainstream epistemology on EU is misplaced. Epistemologists 
should take OU and PU into account, especially if they want their accounts of understand-
ing to include scientific understanding.
Now that we can talk about understanding more precisely, we can begin to see how 
thought experiments might produce it. The question: “How might a thought experiment 
increase S’s understanding of x (where S is an individual or community)?” must first be split 
into three questions.
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First, if we mean S’s EU of x, then we can increase this with a thought experiment that 
contributes to a (good) explanation of x.
If we mean S’s OU of x, this is more complicated. OU consists in grasping relations 
between objects, events, and domains on the one hand, and other objects, experiences, 
background knowledge, and so on, on the other. What sorts of relations are there between 
say, the uncertainty principle and the rest of quantum mechanics? Or between chemis-
try and our experience of chemical substances? One important kind of relation that we 
might grasp between these elements is a semantic relation. With respect to the notion of a 
semantic relation, I want to be inclusive: it could be (a) the pairing or mapping of propo-
sitions, terms, concepts, variables, etc., to their referents; (b) the intensions or psycho-
logical “senses” of propositions, terms, concepts, variables, etc. (which might take the 
form of prototypes, proxytypes, theories, exemplars, definitions, etc.); (c) the location of 
a proposition, concept, etc., in a system of knowledge; (d) truth conditions; or (e)some-
thing else. In any case, building semantic connections or grasping semantic content is 
not the same thing as increasing knowledge since an increase in semantic understanding 
is either a process of establishing/grasping semantic connections, which cannot be identi-
fied with a set of justified true propositional beliefs because processes are not propositions. 
Or it will be a cognitive state which results from having established new semantic 
connections. This state could be reconstructed propositionally, but the proposition “S 
has grasped ‘unmarried adult male’ as the semantic content of ‘bachelor’” is no more S’s 
actual cognitive state than the proposition “I have eaten” is my being full. I conclude 
therefore that one interesting way to increase S’s OU of x is by grasping the semantic 
content of x.
Finally, if we mean S’s PU of x, we have to increase (the quality of) S’s abilities that are 
relevant to x.
My task in the next section is to examine whether thought experiments can increase 
EU, OU and PU in these ways.3
3 Thought experiments increase understanding
3.1 Thought experiments can contribute to explanations
First, if you simply ask people what their “favourite deep elegant or beautiful explana-
tion” is, they sometimes answer with a thought experiment. In 2012 the website edge.org 
did exactly this, putting the above question to 192 people, including Daniel Dennett, 
Lawrence Kraus, Tania Lombrozo, Richard Nisbett, and Stephen Pinker.4 Twenty-one of 
the replies were well-known thought experiments, and another 8 were imagination-based 
inferences that any broad-minded characterization of thought experiments should include. 
Almost a sixth of the participants therefore gave a thought experiment as their favourite 
example of a deep, elegant or beautiful explanation, which shows that at least some people 
naturally think that thought experiments can be (very) good explanations.
Second, a study of thought experiments in textbooks revealed that many thought exper-
iments survive even when “superseded at the cutting edge of science” because they “may 
still be in use to explain particular phenomena economically” (Gilbert and Reiner 2000, 
268). In other words, we continue to educate using outdated thought experiments because 
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they explain a given phenomenon particularly well. In another study, high school stu-
dents, undergraduates and doctoral students were given hard problems in mechanics and 
dynamics and then observed to see what thought experiments they invented and why. The 
authors found that “the most frequently observed purpose of using a thought experiment is 
for ‘explanation’” (Kösem and Özdemir 2014, 882).
Finally, if we consider the main characterizations of explanation in the literature, we 
can find examples of thought experiments that fit into each of them. Perhaps the most 
famous account of explanation is Carl Hempel’s, according to which an explanation is the 
subsumption of a phenomenon under covering laws, that is, “exhibiting the phenomenon 
to be explained as a special case of some general regularity” (Hempel 1965, 257). Darwin’s 
eye thought experiment (described on page 532) helps us to explain the vertebrate eye 
since it provides a series of steps that show how the eye could be subsumed under the 
framework of evolution by natural selection.
For others, an explanation is what we get when we unify various disparate phenomena 
(see Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989; Bangu 2016), for example, by subsuming such phenom-
ena under a common vocabulary, a common cause, a common mechanism, or a common 
formalism. Isaac Newton unified projectile motion (such as throwing a ball on Earth) and 
orbital motion (such as the moon orbiting the Earth) in a “paradigmatic” case of unifica-
tion (Woodward 2014). And Newton’s achievement at least partially relies on his use of a 
thought experiment, what we now call Newton’s cannonball.
Another account portrays explanation as whatever answers a why-question given a con-
trast class (e.g., van Fraassen 1980). That is, why does x happen as opposed to y? Many 
thought experiments fit into this account, including perhaps the most famous thought 
experiment in the literature, Galileo’s falling bodies thought experiment (see Brown 1991; 
McAllister 1996; Norton 1996; Gendler 1998; Palmieri 2003, this volume; Buzzoni 2008, 
106–7), which tells us that bodies of different weights fall at the same speed as opposed to 
speeds that are proportional to their weights. It goes part of the way towards explaining 
why bodies fall this way (and not another way) by suggesting that there could be no other 
way for them to fall.
Finally, there are accounts of explanation that focus on the identification of causal 
chains, causal counterfactuals, or causal networks (see Salmon 1984, Woodward 2003, 
and Strevens 2009, 2013, respectively). Thought experiments will be important here since 
they are one of our main methods for investigating counterfactual dependence claims and 
answering “what if” questions. Häggqvist (2009) explicitly characterizes an important class 
of thought experiments as playing this role, and many others (including e.g., Williamson 
2004) agree that thought experiments are needed to validate counterfactuals (see also 
Cohnitz and Häggqvist, this volume).
In sum, if any of these accounts of explanation are on the right track, thought experi-
ments can play an important role in explanations.
According to the recent literature on understanding, this means that thought experi-
ments can help to increase understanding since coming to possess a good explanation 
is either identical to or very strongly correlated with increased EU (see Hempel 1965; 
Friedman 1974; Achinstein 1983; Kim 1994, 1996; De Regt and Dieks 2005; Keil 2006; 
Lombrozo 2006, 2011; De Regt 2009; Riggs 2009; Khalifa 2011, 2012; Strevens 2013; 
Greco 2014; Kelp 2014; Wilkenfeld 2014; Hills 2015; Hannon forthcoming).
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To conclude, while there might be good reasons to be skeptical about inter-defining 
understanding and explanation in general (Lipton 2009; Gijsbers 2013), it is nevertheless 
the case that since having an explanation provides EU, then, since thought experiments 
can play an important role in generating explanations, they can help to provide EU.
3.2 Thought experiments increase meaningfulness
Existing pedagogical methods test for the semantic form of OU. To see this we need only 
consider written tests of any kind. The sort of question that asks a test-taker to put some-
thing into his or her own words, define a term, or fill in a blank, are testing precisely for 
OU (Stuart 2016). When we pass this sort of test, it is only because at some previous point 
in time we made semantic connections between the idea in question and our other beliefs, 
concepts or abilities in a way that made it meaningful for us. Can thought experiments aid 
us in this regard?
In Stuart (2016) I gave three examples of thought experiments that seem to have been 
designed explicitly for this purpose. I will quickly mention two.
The first is Darwin’s vertebrate eye. By the time we get to this thought experiment in 
Chapter 5 of the Origin, Darwin has already introduced and argued for natural selection. Now 
he wants to forestall some possible objections. Perhaps the most famous is the eye, which 
appears too complicated to have been the result of chance mutations. Darwin answers with 
a thought experiment that takes us through a possible course of evolution from a single 
nerve sensitive to light, to a patch of nerves, the addition of muscles to focus the light, 
to the organ you are using right now to read this. The eye thought experiment helps us 
understand what it means for an organ like the eye to be a product of evolution. We do not 
learn how eyes actually evolved; that is something fossil evidence is unlikely ever to reveal. 
Instead, on completing the thought experiment, we come to appreciate what it means for 
eyes to have evolved.
Another example is Maxwell’s demon. Briefly, Maxwell found himself in the following 
situation by the end of A Theory of Heat: He knew his version of the second law of ther-
modynamics could be violated in principle, but not in practice. And he knew that it would 
not be quite clear what this meant. That is, if we could violate the second law in principle, 
why can’t we violate it in practice? And if we could never violate it in practice, there must 
be some reason for this which would make our inability to violate the second law a matter 
of principle. Maxwell answers with the demon thought experiment (see Peacock, this vol-
ume, 212–15). By performing it we come to appreciate why we will not witness any actual 
violations of the law in nature but that such violations are not forbidden. We do this by see-
ing that if we were the demon, we could violate the second law. Meanwhile we recognize 
that there is probably nothing in nature that could actually do what the demon does on a 
time scale relevant to human interests. This way, we come to understand the meaning or 
semantic content (including modal strength) of Maxwell’s statistical second law.
The idea that thought experiments can increase the meaningfulness of a scientific idea, 
concept, event, etc., crops up again and again in the history of science, especially in the 
history of physics (Beller 1999, 107; Norton, unpublished, ch. 29). Alexander Koyré noted 
that thought experiments take a concept and make it meaningful by connecting it to our 
experience. In his words, thought experiments “help scientists to bridge the gap between 
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empirical facts and theoretical concepts” (Koyré 1968). In other words, they provide 
empirical semantic content for parts of theory. Athanasios Velentzas and Krystallia Halkia 
argue that thought experiments are used “both for clarifying the consequences of physics 
theories and for bridging the gap between the abstract concepts inherent in the theories 
and everyday life experiences” (Velentzas and Halkia 2013a, 3027). And in a similar vein, 
Lynn Stephens and John Clement argue that thought experiments “appear to have consid-
erable value as a sense-making strategy” (Stephens and Clement 2006).
Thought experiments have therefore been recognized as helping us to create semantic 
connections between new ideas, concepts, models, etc., on the one hand, and experiences 
that we have already had, experiences we might have, existing knowledge, abilities, con-
cepts, etc., on the other. In other words, through them we can schematize difficult theoreti-
cal entities (in Kant’s sense; see Buzzoni, this volume, 336; Stuart 2017).5
But is this the same as increasing OU? Many philosophers argue that learning what 
something means is an instance of increased understanding (e.g., Davies 1981; Elgin 2000; 
Pettit 2002; Longworth 2008). And as with explanations and EU, we can be quite hesitant 
to identify meaning-making with understanding in general, and still happy to identify it as 
a means to or type of OU, since semantic relations do seem to be one sort of “coherence-
making” relation that we can grasp. Thus, since we can increase meaningfulness using 
thought experiments, we can increase OU using thought experiments.
3.3 Thought experiments increase fruitfulness
Again focusing on pedagogical orthodoxy, we already test for fruitfulness when we have 
test-takers derive, explain, extrapolate, or otherwise evince that they can use an idea to do 
something they could not before. And we take this to be evidence that a test-taker under-
stands that idea. This can be applied to the case of thought experiments in the following 
way: a thought experiment increases S’s understanding of x if after performing the thought 
experiment S can do something that S could not before, for example, manipulate a model, 
make a successful prediction, produce a good explanation for a phenomenon, derive a 
particular conclusion, etc. Even if the new abilities are accompanied by an increase in our 
stock of justified true beliefs, we would still want to deny that they just are justified true 
beliefs.
There are reasons to think that thought experiments can increase fruitfulness. Consider 
thought experiments that are used in therapy to give participants power over themselves 
to, for example, overcome a fear of heights or face an abusive partner (see Gendler 2004). 
Examples can be found in the scientific context as well. Velentzas and Halkia (2013b) took 
a group of high school students who could not make correct inferences about the relation 
between orbital and projectile motion. They presented the students with Newton’s can-
nonball thought experiment and the students could then pass their tests, even with ques-
tions that required a good deal of extrapolation. They repeated this study using Einstein’s 
elevator and train with the same results (2013a).
The case can also be made historically. After performing Darwin’s eye thought experi-
ment the scientific community gained (and continues to profit from) the ability to inves-
tigate complicated traits by imagining a string of possible mutations, each of which is 
adaptive given its environment for the organism that possesses it. This has been a useful 
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strategy in addressing objections to evolution as well as providing new hypotheses for traits 
and organs of interest.
To summarize the last few sections: thought experiments can increase EU of x by help-
ing to explain x, OU of x by increasing the meaningfulness of x, and PU of x by increasing 
the fruitfulness of x.6 Now, let’s see what the literature on understanding can contribute to 
the epistemology of thought experiments.
4 How do thought experiments increase understanding?
4.1 How thought experiments increase explanatory understanding (EU)
To say precisely how thought experiments contribute to EU, we would first need to 
choose or defend a characterization of explanation (or if we are pluralists, several). 
Given a particular characterization, we can then ask what sorts of explanations thought 
experiments take part in and how, whether thought experiment-based explanations 
have special qualities that make them better or worse than other kinds of explanations 
(for example, their experimental, narrative, or dialogical features), whether thought 
experiment-based explanations work by testimony, and how thought experiments jus-
tify modal claims (when that is their role in an explanation). It would require more 
space than I have to enter into the long-standing debates surrounding these questions. 
Instead, I will focus on OU and PU.
4.2 How thought experiments increase objectual understanding (OU)
There is no direct discussion of OU in the literature on thought experiments, but there are 
a number of resources in epistemology (not to mention aesthetics, hermeneutics, phenom-
enology, and philosophy of language) that can be brought to bear. In the space I have, I 
will highlight the work of Elizabeth Camp (2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, unpublished), 
which turns on the notions of perspectives, characterizations, and frames. The basic idea of 
a perspective is that when we read a narrative from a certain point of view, we learn to 
see the world as if it were the way the narrative presents it. We pay attention to different 
features of the world, and we are directed to experience those features as having specific 
relevance and intensities. We may evaluate these features differently, too, making moral, 
aesthetic or other value judgments in a way we would not otherwise. While watching a 
Saturday morning cartoon, we think it is morally acceptable for characters to smash one 
another over the head with mallets. And we feel uncomfortable reading Lolita because we 
are supposed to take up Humbert’s perspective, and we don’t want to.
When we apply a perspective (even our own) to something particular, we have a char-
acterization. Because we are taking up Humbert’s perspective when we read Lolita, we 
(are supposed to) characterize Dolores as an object of sexual desire. And on Saturday 
mornings we (are supposed to) characterize Daffy Duck as occasionally deserving a good 
mallet-smashing.
More recently, Camp has introduced the notion of a frame. A frame is a representa-
tional vehicle that crystalizes a perspective by suggesting a characterization. For example, 
Romeo regards (“characterizes”) Juliet as so much “above” everyone else that you cannot 
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even look at her without being “blinded” by her charm. Romeo encourages us to share in 
this characterization with the utterance (frame): “Juliet is the sun.” Likewise, I might want 
you to enter into a characterization that portrays our friend Jane as someone who always 
expects everything to go wrong, thinks everything is her fault, and demurs to any authority. 
To do this I present the frame: “It’s as if Jane had a puppy who died when she was little 
and she’s still convinced it was her fault” (Camp 2009, 110). It is easy to see how models 
in science may serve as frames. For example, Bohr’s model of the atom is a frame which 
prompts us to characterize features of atoms in certain ways.
Perspectives, characterizations and frames are non-propositional. They are not thoughts 
but tools for thinking. We can express frames and characterizations using propositions, 
but these expressions are not the frames or characterizations themselves. This is because 
any characterization or perspective will outstrip its propositional reconstruction since 
the characterization can always be applied to new situations which were not included in 
the propositional reconstruction. To actually have a characterization, one must have the 
appropriate dispositions to evaluate, focus on, interpret, and relate together the features of 
a subject in a certain way.
OU-oriented thought experiments can be understood as frames which are meant to 
snap us into certain characterizations.7 Some of Darwin’s opponents characterized the eye 
as a watch. Even if we saw a watch on a deserted island, we would nevertheless assume the 
watch was created because of its complexity and obvious purposefulness. This frame sug-
gests a characterization of the eye as being like a watch, which is complex, purposeful and 
the product of intentional creation. That is how the frame casts doubt on the idea that 
eyes are the result of a series of chance mutations. Darwin, on the other hand, presents a 
competing characterization using his thought experiment, which narrates a series of muta-
tions that could plausibly result in a fully functioning eye beginning with a single nerve. 
This characterization makes it easy to see the eye as having evolved.
Darwin’s frame succeeded because it allowed us to associate with the eye (and other 
complicated organs) a whole new set of semantic and explanatory relationships, possible 
causal histories, relations to other organs, evaluations, and so on, in a way that accords 
with the values of science (explanatory power, simplicity, predictive accuracy, etc.). Since 
possessing such a characterization is not possessing any specific propositions but rather cer-
tain dispositions, it is clear how the right frame could enable someone to pass the relevant 
tests of meaningfulness mentioned above.
How exactly do we gain OU by using frames? Camp writes “I might, for instance, gain 
a more intimate appreciation for the anguish of orphanhood, or for the attractions of 
gambling or being a bully, by empathizing with characters who undergo those emotions” 
(2009, 116). Such imaginative exercises help us understand orphanhood, gambling addic-
tion or bullying by grasping what these mean from a first-person perspective. And, as Elgin 
(2014) argues, thought experiments can exemplify properties. That is, they can provide 
(perceptual or cognitive) access to an instance of a property, while also referring to that 
property, allowing us to make new inferences about the class of things that possess that 
property. This extends our semantic reach; not only do we grasp the meaning of, e.g., a 
specific gambling addiction by imagining ourselves as a specific gambling addict, we now 
begin to understand gambling addicts of all sorts, and even perhaps addicts in general. 
This is how thought experiments increase semantic OU in an epistemologically interesting 
way: they give us direct access to properties and indirect (inferential) access to the class of 
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objects that possess those properties (by exemplification) while also providing new tools for 
thinking about those objects (by the characterization).8
Furthermore, thought experiments will be particularly helpful as frames since they do 
not simply suggest a characterization; they prompt us to experiment with that characteriza-
tion, filling it in ourselves as we go. More on this below.
I conclude that one way for an OU-oriented thought experiment to be successful is 
to be a good frame. That is, a good OU-oriented thought experiment will prompt in an 
efficient manner an epistemically and semantically valuable characterization or perspec-
tive. This allows us to appeal to a normative theory of perspectives in order to work out a 
normative theory of thought experiments, which I think is an attractive prospect.
4.3 How thought experiments increase practical understanding (PU)
Portraying thought experiments as frames allows us to explain some of their potential to 
create PU. For example, Camp notes that in Shakespeare’s sonnet 73, Shakespeare likens 
his own dying to fall becoming winter, twilight becoming night, and fire becoming ash. 
These frames help us characterize death. But they also provide a way to cope with death. 
We realize that death is “a natural and inevitable moment following on from more abun-
dant, energetic ones.” We may not like the cold and lonely images of winter and night, 
but we may be comforted by “acceptance and awareness of what lies ahead” (2009, 118). 
Likewise, it is only because we can see Newton’s cannonball as the projectile which fills 
the gap between projectile and orbital motion that we can learn to apply our knowledge of 
one context to the other.
Besides this plausible option, there are other ways to explain the ability of thought 
experiments to increase PU. Again, space constrains me to consider only one. In this case, 
I will look briefly at the work of Alison Hills (2010, 2015).
Hills discusses understanding in terms of “grasp,” which she explicates as an increase of 
“cognitive control.”
The best way of thinking of [understanding] is by an analogy with grasping a ball 
or cup of tea or similar. If you grasp a ball, you have it under your control. You can 
manipulate it, move it, turn it round, and so on, that is you (normally) have a set 
of practical abilities or practical know how, which you can exercise if you choose.
(2015, 3)
More formally, you understand p when you can follow an explanation for why p, explain 
why p in your own words, draw the conclusion that p from q, make analogical inferences 
from q´ to the relevantly similar p´, use p to explain other related propositions, and finally, 
use p´ analogically to explain related propositions, q´.
Those are Hills’s conditions, which she uses to explicate understanding-why (the sort of 
understanding we have when we understand that q is why p). This might seem like a depar-
ture from PU, but it is only a particular case. Hills claims that “guidance from an expert 
can certainly help, but that help does not necessarily take the form of assertions passing on 
standard propositional knowledge; or even if it does, that only works if it is combined with 
practice,” and, “I don’t think that it is very plausible to identify cognitive control with 
extra propositional knowledge. For no particular extra number of pieces of propositional 
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knowledge guarantees that you have the grasp required of understanding, the ability to 
draw conclusions yourself in a new case” (2015, 11).
Having cognitive control is a matter of having a certain set of abilities concerning prop-
ositions, for Hills, and that set of abilities, though often expressible in propositions, is not 
propositional itself. Hills’s account can be extended to PU by removing the requirement 
that the object of understanding be a proposition. Jimi understands how to play the guitar 
because he has a set of abilities towards a musical instrument instead of a proposition. 
Likewise, a student may be said to understand a signalling pathway in biochemistry when 
she can create a computer simulation that captures its behaviour accurately and robustly.
With Hills’s notion of understanding extended to PU, we can focus on how thought 
experiments might produce it. I will be drawing on some recent remarks made by Hills, 
concerning how understanding comes from analogies and questions.9
First, consider knowledge, which can be gained through the testimony of others. A 
trusted expert asserts a true proposition, and we justifiably believe it and thereby gain 
knowledge. However, this will not work for PU, which requires the development of a 
set of abilities and not merely believing the right propositions. Instead, when we gain 
understanding with the help of others we are like Meno’s slave boy, who is led to under-
standing by a series of actions that he performs in response to leading questions. Besides 
leading questions, we can also use analogies. Hills provides the example of treating light 
as a wave to understand the interference pattern in a double slit experiment. Since know-
ing requires believing true propositions, questions and analogies will not typically be able 
to transmit knowledge by testimony because questions do not assert propositions, and 
analogies are (often) literally false. What is common to understanding gained through 
questioning and analogy is that questions and analogies require us to work on our own. We 
are not given the answer to the question nor the key to interpreting the analogy, though 
we are encouraged to try to find them. And this exercise helps us develop new abilities or 
link existing abilities to new situations, until we can properly be said to have the relevant 
PU. For example, a computer scientist might ask a student, “Why do you think you are 
getting this error message?” as a way of helping her understand where she has gone wrong, 
and thereby increase her PU of a particular computer model. A driving instructor might 
tell a student to think of driving as a video game to increase the student’s PU of driving. If 
you have a fear of airline travel, a therapist might ask you to visualize getting on a plane, 
flying, and landing, over and over, until you have the ability to fly and are no longer afraid 
(Gendler 2004).
The key is the open-endedness of the prompt, which forces the agent to work things out 
for herself. In so doing, she lays the groundwork for the new abilities which constitute PU. 
A good PU-oriented thought experiment must therefore present a problem, along with 
enough information to work it out, without being prohibitively difficult. There will be 
enough information to set the agent on the right track, but not so much that the informa-
tion can be accepted without developing any of the desired cognitive control.
Of course it is not just questions, metaphors and analogies that spur us into (cogni-
tive) action. A thought experiment could be open-ended in this sense by employing 
a diagram, as these can be approached in many different ways (see Meynell 2014, this 
volume). There are also riddles and puzzles, which are regularly employed by logicians 
to get logic students to learn certain styles of reasoning.10 A well-timed exclamation 
can also do the job.
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Thought experiments can be exemplary prompts. First, they can combine several of 
the above prompt-types in one. Einstein and Galileo’s thought experiments were often 
presented in the form of a paradox or puzzle and accompanied by a diagram. Second, their 
(at least semi-) experimental nature ensures their open-endedness. Thought experiments 
begin with a scenario or the statement of a problem, which causes us to create an imaginary 
world to explore the scenario or problem. We “set up” or “design” a thought experiment 
in this imaginary world, which we then “run” and “observe.” John Gilbert and Miriam 
Reiner (2000) argue that thought experiments in science textbooks are typically sub- 
optimal precisely because they do not require students to run the thought experiment and 
then observe what happens in their own minds. In too many cases, the conclusion of the 
thought experiment is given first, and then the imagined scenario is introduced, which is 
supposed to lend credence to the conclusion. In this case, students do not vary variables 
in their minds; they simply follow along a text. This is better than simply reading the 
conclusion, but is not as good as having the student work through the problem on their 
own. The most successful thought experiments require our mental effort.11 Einstein asks, 
“What would light look like if you were riding on a lightwave?” and Maxwell asks, “Could 
a demon in a closed system decrease the system’s entropy?” To answer these questions, 
the scientific community required time and effort, which is exactly what was needed to 
increase the relevant PU.
5 Concluding thoughts
Much more needs to be said about how thought experiments increase understanding. For 
instance, we need to identify how thought experiments can mislead us, and if there are 
any kinds of understanding that thought experiments cannot provide. Relevant to the 
discussion of EU, Brown (2014) points out that thought experiments seem to provide “top-
down” (or formal) explanations more easily or more often than “bottom-up” or mechanis-
tic explanations. Is this necessarily the case, and if so, why?
And there are many more ways the literature on understanding can interact with the 
literature on thought experiments. There is agreement in the epistemological litera-
ture that understanding comes in grades (Kvanvig 2003; Elgin 2007; Baumberger 2011, 
forthcoming; Grimm 2014; Hills 2015; Hannon forthcoming). We will therefore have 
grades of EU, OU and PU. The tests we give to others and to ourselves in academic con-
texts are graded, and so, as graders of tests, we already have an idea of what counts as less 
than perfect understanding, and how much a thought experiment can help to increase the 
degree of someone’s understanding. Perhaps one way epistemologists can therefore investi-
gate degrees of EU, OU and PU is to look at the tests we give our students (and ourselves) 
and ask how thought experiments aid us in passing them.
Also, grades can be measures of breadth or depth (Elgin 2007; Strevens 2013; Greco 
2014). This is helpful for increasing the precision with which we classify good understand-
ing-oriented thought experiments. Can thought experiments provide both broad and deep 
EU, OU and PU? If not, why not?
Finally, understanding is a success term (Baumberger 2011). This is clearly true in 
science, where a student is judged to understand a model, system, method, or concept 
only when she or he can pass certain tests of understanding, which will be contextual 
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(depending on the domain and problem type) and conventional (like the 5-sigma confi-
dence level in physics). These tests can amount to operationalizations of the success condi-
tions for understanding (Stuart 2016). But much more needs to be said about the aptness 
of any given test as a means for evaluating the state of someone’s understanding relative 
to the success conditions and also about the success conditions themselves, e.g., must they 
track whether our understanding “latches on” to the world? If so, how can they do this? 
How “objective” can the tests be?
***
In this chapter, I drew attention to the potential for mutual illumination between the 
literature on thought experiments and the literature on understanding. We saw that 
thought experiments can increase explanatory, objectual and practical understanding, 
and also that what counts as a good understanding-oriented thought experiment will 
depend on the sort of understanding we want. A good explanatory thought experiment 
will participate in a good explanation. One way to be a good objectual thought experi-
ment is to create a good frame to get us into the right characterization or perspective. And 
one way to be a good practical thought experiment is to be an open-ended, goal-directed 
prompt that entreats us to perform certain cognitive actions, which can then be repeated 
and reinforced to build new abilities.
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Notes
 1 The suggestion that thought experiments increase understanding is not new. Brown made a similar 
point much earlier (1992, 274), although principally as a criticism of Norton. He has recently 
turned back to the issue, looking at thought experiments and understanding more directly (Brown 
2014). Other philosophers of science have focused on understanding in thought experiments as 
well (e.g., Nersessian 1992, 2007; Humphreys 1993; Gooding 1992, 1994; Gendler 1998, 2000; 
Arthur 1999; Lipton 2009; Camilleri 2014), but none (save Catherine Elgin) have taken advan-
tage of the recent work on understanding in mainstream epistemology. That is my aim in this 
chapter.
 2 Whether all forms of understanding can be reconstructed exclusively in terms of knowledge is the 
subject of a large debate (see, e.g., Hetherington 2001; Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003; Grimm 
2006; Pritchard 2009; Hills 2015; Riaz 2015; Hannon forthcoming). I do not want to commit 
myself to a position here. Perhaps some forms of understanding can be reduced to ordinary propo-
sitional knowledge, and others to non-propositional knowledge (such as knowledge-how). I claim 
below that several forms of understanding are not reducible to propositional knowledge, and this 
is sufficient to distance these forms of understanding from knowledge, standardly conceived.
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 3 One reason I chose this tripartite distinction is because it subsumes most of the ways thought 
experiments lead to understanding that were mentioned at the beginning. For example, to illus-
trate a theory or idea is often to explain it (EU) or help us grasp its coherence-making relations 
(OU). Controlling for extraneous variables and inverting ideals of natural order enable us to do 
things we could not do before, which is a way of increasing PU. To exemplify a property is to 
provide direct access to that property (which is a way of drawing new semantic or explanatory 
relations to it) and also to refer to the property, which allows us to make inferences about all items 
with that property, which is to increase its PU. And so on.
 4 www.edge.org/responses/what-is-your-favorite-deep-elegant-or-beautiful-explanation.
 5 This is not a trivial accomplishment. Determining the semantic content of theoretical entities is 
the general case of a solution to what Bas van Fraassen has called the “problem of coordination” 
(van Fraassen 2008). I discuss the idea that thought experiments are used in science to solve it in 
Stuart (2017).
 6 The same thought experiment might do more than one of these, even at the same time; see (Stuart 
2016) for examples.
 7 Portraying thought experiments as frames would make them tools to increase understanding rather 
than knowledge, not just for me, but for Camp as well. She writes,
Insofar as philosophy seeks understanding, we need to do more than just identify a set of 
justified true propositions. We need to know which propositions we should pay attention 
to, what explanatory structures to impose upon them, and (in the moral case at least) 
even how we should feel about them.
(2009, 128)
 I am merely emphasizing the power that frames and characterizations have for exploring and eval-
uating the semantic content of entities, terms, events or domains, and showing how this can lead 
specifically to OU.
 8 Camp hints at thought experiments having such dual powers herself when she writes,
Philosophers also use thought experiments ... to present a supposedly common phenom-
enon in especially stark and vivid terms, thereby helping us to focus our attention on 
its structurally relevant features ... But such thought experiments can also operate ... by 
describing counterfactual situations in concrete detail, they can trigger a kind of experi-
ential acquaintance that an abstract description misses.
(2009, 124)
 9 This discussion draws on a presentation given by Hills at Fordham University, New York, June 20, 
2016.
10 Philosophical discussions of riddles, and riddles as metaphors, can be found at least as far back as 
William of Conches (c. 1090 – 1154 CE), who (to some extent) equated the two. William believed 
that riddles and metaphors were important for appealing to our cognition, which was a faculty of the 
soul, using speech (a faculty of the body). According to William, riddles, metaphors, allegories, and 
fables were “labyrinths of imagery” that enclosed truth in darkness. Peter Dronke summarizes “The 
initiate can enter that darkness and there find the truth. Yet it is not only a dark place, but a passage 
in which [s/]he must walk: what [s/]he finds in the labyrinth, we might say to paraphrase, is not a truth 
ready-made, but a challenge ... ” (1974, 49–50). Another interesting anticipation of this discussion is 
in pseudo-Dionysius, who says that “incongruous symbols” (per dissimilia symbola) are sometimes best 
for teaching people about difficult subjects, because they are not so similar to their targets that they 
could be confused for the object of study itself (Roques, Heil, and de Gandillac 1970, 74ff.). Thanks 
to Maximilian Wick for discussion and references on this point.
11 This will be true for laboratory experiments as well. As regards PU, being told the conclusion 
of an experiment is less helpful than watching that experiment performed, which is less helpful 
than being guided through the experiment step-by-step, which is less helpful than running the 
experiment yourself.
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